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Whose Pregnancy Is It Anyway? 
The Intrusion of Abortion-Related Informed Consent Laws and Compelled Medical 
Treatment on the Doctor-Pregnant Patient Relationship 
 
Jennifer Jascoll 
 
I. Introduction 
In January 2012, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Texas law requiring women 
seeking an abortion to have a sonogram, hear a physician’s detailed explanation of it, and listen 
to the fetal heartbeat. In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the 
Fifth Circuit saw no reason against requiring that the woman be fully informed of her decision 
through the provision of this purportedly medically necessary information because “[d]enying 
[the woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her ability to decide than 
providing the information.”1  The Fifth Circuit concluded that such an informed consent 
disclosure is “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information.”2  Yet Texas is not alone in 
having such an informed consent law for abortion procedures and, in fact, its law represents a 
growing trend among states.  As of May 2012, twenty states require abortion providers to 
perform ultrasounds and seven of those states require providers to offer the women an 
opportunity to view the images.
3
  Eleven states require verbal or written counseling materials to 
include information on ultrasound services.
4
  There are no state laws requiring informed consent 
disclosures to the same invasive and/or graphic degree for other medical procedures.  
While the expansion of a state’s ability to regulate abortion through informed consent 
statutes has troubling implications, the compelled medical treatment of women who continue 
                                                 
1
 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2012). 
2
 667 F.3d at 577. 
3
 Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last visited May 4, 2012).  The seven states are 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
4
 Id. 
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their pregnancies to term is equally troubling.  These are women who refuse, for whatever 
reason, to undergo cesarean sections (“c-sections”) or other medical interventions that would, in 
their health care providers’ opinion, be in the interest of the fetuses.  Such situations arise, for 
example, when women refuse to undergo c-sections or induced labor in favor of natural 
childbirth, refuse artificial life-sustaining treatment until the fetuses are viable, or choose to 
delivery vaginally at home with midwives rather than undergo c-sections at hospitals.  In 
response, health care providers and family members seek court orders to override the decisions 
of these women to benefit the fetuses. 
This paper explores how the law treats pregnant women as incapable of making decisions 
by infringing on their right to consent to or to refuse medical treatment during their pregnancies.  
The Supreme Court recognizes that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded 
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”5  Yet the law does not appear to recognize such a right for pregnant women; 
instead, it creates tension over what roles family members, health care providers, legislatures, 
and courts have in the women’s reproductive decision-making. 
Part II of this paper outlines how the Supreme Court decisions in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart chipped away at pregnant women’s 
decision-making capabilities and opened the door for states to enact restrictive abortion-related 
informed consent laws.
6
  Casey and Carhart broadened the constitutional standard – from “strict 
scrutiny” in Roe v. Wade to “undue burden” – for reviewing such laws so that “under the undue 
burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over 
                                                 
5
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
6
 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest.”7  Part III outlines four appellate 
level court decisions addressing whether pregnant women can refuse to undergo medical 
treatment.
 8
  In those instances, third-parties sought to compel the treatment of pregnant women 
who choose to continue their pregnancies but who exercise their right to refuse the treatment 
proposed by their health care providers. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant patient 
relationship by transforming it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third party 
interests during all stages of pregnancy.  In Casey the Supreme Court stated that “[a]bortion is a 
unique act.  It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with 
the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the 
spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist….”9  
Now there is room for outsiders to second-guess the decision-making capacity of pregnant 
women – as if to say, “is that your final answer?” – and invade the doctor-pregnant patient 
relationship.  Specifically, many states have adopted informed consent laws that direct the 
conversation between doctors and their pregnant patients who seek abortions.  Federal appellate 
court decisions in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds and  
Lakey provide two recent examples.
10
 
This paper concludes that the law is regulating pregnant women’s right to consent to or 
refuse medical treatment beyond the traditional notions of compelling state interests in protecting 
                                                 
7
 505 U.S. at 886; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8
 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); In Re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 
66 F.Supp.2d 1247 (N.D.Fl. 1999). 
9
 505 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added). 
10
 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Lakey, supra note 1. 
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life.  In so doing, the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant patient relationship and 
transformed it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third party interests. 
II. Casey and Carhart: Opening the Door to Restrictive Abortion-Related Informed 
Consent Laws and Closing the Door on Pregnant Women’s Decision-Making Capacity 
 
A. Background 
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide any right of privacy, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that such a right emanates from the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights 
and cannot be invaded “absent a showing of a compelling subordinate state interest.”11  This 
right extends to intimate and personal decisions such as marriage, contraception, education, and 
child rearing.
12
  The Constitution also protects “the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”13  That is, until the state demonstrates an 
interest in any of the four compelling interests that prevail over the individual right: preserving 
life, protecting the interests of third parties, preventing suicide, or maintaining the ethic integrity 
of the medical profession so compelling that it overrides the right of the individual.
14
   
In Roe, the Court recognized the state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus and 
identified viability as the “compelling point” permitting state intervention.15  Until that point was 
reached, “the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, [was] free to determine, 
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be 
terminated.”16  Twenty years later, however, that compelling point began to disappear and state 
informed consent laws began to prevail over the individual right.  Even though it affirmed the 
                                                 
11
 Griswold  v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965). 
12
 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, Inc., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
13
 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).  
14
 Superintendent of Blechertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977). 
15
 410 U.S. at 113. 
16
 Id. at 163. 
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central holdings of Roe, the Court established in Casey that “the State has legitimate interests 
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus 
that may become a child.”17  With Carhart the compelling point disappeared in favor of the 
state’s interest.18 
B. Casey and Carhart 
In Casey, the Court started to chip away at the Roe “compelling point” framework and 
strict scrutiny standard of review governing abortion regulations.
 19
  The State could “enact rules 
and regulations designed to encourage [the pregnant woman] to know that there are 
philosophical and social arguments of great weight” for continuing the pregnancy.20  The pre- 
and post-viability distinction no longer applied.  States could express their preference for life by 
regulating pre-viability abortions if the restrictions did not impose an “undue burden” on the 
women’s right to access the procedure.21  The Court ambiguously described the undue burden 
standard as “shorthand for the conclusion that the state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”22  
Requiring informed consent disclosures of state-produced materials and warnings provided states 
with a means to express their preference for life.  So long as the disclosed information was 
“truthful and not misleading” then it was relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.23 
In Casey, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-
3220, required that a pregnant woman give her informed consent prior to undergoing an abortion 
procedure, receive State-published materials at least 24 hours prior to the procedure, and undergo 
                                                 
17
 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). 
18
 550 U.S. at 135. 
19
 505 U.S. at 872-73 (stating that the trimester framework is flawed because it “misconceives the nature of the 
pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life” as stated in Roe).  
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 878-79. 
22
 Id. at 877 (emphasis added). 
23
 Id. at 882. 
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a mandatory 24-hour waiting period.
24
  The materials included the health risks of abortion and 
childbirth as well as the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.”25 The woman had to 
confirm in writing that she received this information and was made aware of printed materials 
“describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, 
information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption 
and other services as alternatives to abortion.”26  The woman also had to confirm spousal 
notification barring any medical emergencies.
27
 
Planned Parenthood challenged the Act for violating abortion providers’ First 
Amendment rights not to provide risk information in a manner proscribed by the state.
28
  The 
Court rejected this argument as the providers’ First Amendment rights “[were] implicated but 
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the 
State.”29  That reasonable licensing and regulation extended to the health and safety of a woman 
seeking an abortion as it did for other medical procedures.
30
  Thus the Court viewed the real 
constitutional issue as concerning “whether the State can resolve these philosophical questions in 
such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter” except for instances of rape, 
incest, or medical emergency.
31
  The Court believed that “under the undue burden standard a 
State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if 
those measures do not further a health interest.”32 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 881. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id.  The Act also imposed certain reporting requirements on abortion providers. 
28
 Id. at 884. 
29
 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
30
 Id. at 878. 
31
 Id. at 851. 
32
 Id. at 886. 
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In this way Casey assumed that women lack the capacity to make medical treatment 
decisions.  Gone were the days of Roe when health care providers could use their medical 
judgment, free from state regulation, to assist pregnant women.
33
  Gone were the days of private 
conversation between doctor and pregnant patient.  Abortion was now “a unique act…. fraught 
with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her 
decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and 
society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist….”34  The Court now 
framed abortion as an act involving multiple third-parties with claims in the decision-making 
process.  Informed consent disclosures were necessary to “reduc[e] the risk that a woman may 
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her 
decision was not fully informed.”35 
Fifteen years later, Carhart provided the Court with an opportunity to affirm Casey and 
prop wide open the door for states to expand their abortion-related informed consent laws.   
There the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2000 (“PBABA”) banning the 
intact “dilation and evacuation” technique most often used during the second trimester.36  The 
Court reiterated that the government “has a significant role to play in regulating the medical 
profession” and that “[t]he government may use its voice and regulatory authority to show its 
profound respect for the life within the woman.”37  The State has a legitimate interest in ensuring 
that the pregnant woman understands the exact nature of the procedure.
38
  PBABA did not 
                                                 
33
 410 U.S. at 163. 
34
 505 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added). 
35
 Id. at 882. 
36
 550 U.S. at 135. 
37
 Id. at 128. 
38
 Id. at 159. 
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impose an undue burden because it furthered legitimate government interests in protecting the 
life of a fetus and the emotional well-being of a pregnant woman.
39
   
Thus the Carhart decision permitted states to regulate the conversation between health 
care providers and their pregnant patients.  The Court noted acknowledged that  
[i]n a decision fraught with emotional consequences some doctors may prefer not 
to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining themselves to 
the required statement of risks the procedure entails….  Any number of patients 
facing imminent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all the details, lest 
the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures become the more 
intense. 
 
[…] 
 
It is, however, this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will 
be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State….40 
 
In this way the Court recognized that such regulation went beyond what health care providers 
were inclined – or legally required – to disclose to their patients.  Other medical procedures did 
not require the same invasive and/or graphic degree of detail.  Yet the parties outside of the 
doctor-patient relationship seemed to matter most because “[t]he State’s interest in respect for 
life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical 
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a 
decision to elect a late-term abortion.”41 
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, the majority’s reasoning 
against the necessity of a health exception contradicted its earlier reasoning in Casey.
42
  In Casey 
proponents of the PA Act argued that the spousal notification provision was not an undue burden 
                                                 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
41
 Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
42
 Id. at 188-89 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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for almost 99 percent of women seeking abortions.
43
  The Court rejected this argument and stated 
that the proper constitutional analysis should review the group affected by the statute, not the 
unaffected group.
44
  Such an analysis revealed instances where spousal notification could lead to 
domestic violence.  The Court reasoned that the existence of this possibility, however small in 
likelihood and however small the percentage of affected women, presented enough of a 
substantial obstacle and an undue burden to render the spousal notification provision 
unconstitutional.
45
 
In contrast, the Carhart Court found that PBABA survived review because its opponents 
failed to show that the ban on intact D&E unduly burdened a “large fraction of relevant cases.”46  
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that a “large fraction” was not the requisite determinant as 
established by Casey.  Instead, the provision “‘must be judged by reference to those [women] for 
whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction…. The very purpose of a health 
exception is to protect women in exceptional cases’”47   
The Carhart Court also adopted a paternalistic tone when it observed that “[i]t is self-
evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more 
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learned, only after the event, what she did not 
know” in so far as the nature of the procedure.48  The Court noted that the Act also protected the 
health of the mother given the medical uncertainty as to the health risks of the procedure.
49
  
Justice Ginsburg challenged this tone in her dissent when she noted that “[t]he solution the Court 
approves… is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different 
                                                 
43
 505 U.S. at 894. 
44
 Id. at 894. 
45
 Id. at 894-95. 
46
 550 U.S. at 167-68. 
47
 Id. at 188 (emphasis in original). 
48
 Id. at 158. 
49
 Id. at 161. 
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procedures and their attendant risks….  Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make 
an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”50 
III. Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment and the Powers That Compel Them 
 
While the expansion of a state’s ability to regulate abortion through informed consent 
statutes has troubling implications, the compelled medical treatment of women who continue 
their pregnancies to term is equally troubling.  A competent adult generally may refuse medical 
treatment as “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body….”51  This refusal can even apply in instances where treatment 
may prolong or save a person’s life.52  Yet the right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute 
for pregnant women, specifically with respect to c-sections.  These situations arise, for example, 
when women refuse to undergo c-sections or induced labor in favor of natural childbirth, refuse 
artificial life-sustaining treatment until the fetuses are viable, or choose to delivery vaginally at 
home with midwives rather than undergo c-sections at hospitals  Interestingly enough, c-sections 
accounted for 32.7% of all U.S. births in 2009.
53
  Less than 1% of pregnant women opt for a 
birth outside of a hospital.
54
  Most of this small minority uses a midwife birth attendant.  In 2009, 
20,489 of the 4.13 million U.S. births were attended by a midwife at home or a freestanding birth 
center.
55
 
                                                 
50
 Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
51
 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 
497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment….”); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is the prerogative 
of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.”). 
52
 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-65 (N.J. 1976). 
53
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. VitalStats. “Method of Delivery 
(Cesarean and Vaginal Births), 2009,” http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm. [last accessed May 5, 2012].  
According to government statistics, c-sections accounted for 1,353,572 out of 4,130,665 births. 
54
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. VitalStats. “BFACIL by 
ATTEND (2009 Birth Data – State Detail),” http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm. [last accessed May 5, 2012] 
55
 Id. 
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In such situations, health care providers and family members seek court orders to 
override the decisions of these women to benefit the fetuses.  The following appellate cases 
illustrate how courts have acquiesced to or rejected such requests. 
I. Four Appellate Cases on the Right (or Lack Thereof) to Refuse C-Sections 
The Supreme Court of Georgia ordered that a pregnant woman undergo a c-section in 
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority.
56
  There Jessie Mae Jefferson went to 
the hospital for pre-natal care during her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy.
57
  The doctor informed 
Ms. Jefferson that she had a complete placenta previa which required a c-section to preserve the 
life of the fetus and her own life.
58
  She refused to undergo the c-section, as well as blood 
transfusions, for religious reasons.
59
  The hospital sought a court ruling as to whether the fetus 
had any legal right to the protection of the court.
60
   
The Georgia Supreme Court found that George statute criminalized abortion and thus the 
state had a duty to protect the fetus.
61
  This state duty outweighed any refusal made by Ms. 
Jefferson.
62
  The court concluded that the lives of the mother and fetus were “inseparable” and 
thus it was “appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it [was] necessary 
to give the child an opportunity to live.”63  Thus the court ordered Ms. Jefferson to undergo a c-
section despite her refusal.
64
 
                                                 
56
 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). 
57
 Id. at 458. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 460. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. at 458. 
64
 Id. at 460. 
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The Illinois Appellate Court arrived at a different conclusion in In Re Baby Boy Doe.
65
  
That case concerned “Doe,” a “mentally competent” married woman who received regular 
prenatal care at a Chicago hospital.
66
  Dr. James Meserow, a board-certified 
obstetrician/gynecologist affiliated with the hospital, examined Doe during her 35th week of 
pregnancy and recommended an immediate c-section or induced labor.
67
  Doe refused on 
religious grounds and chose to proceed with natural childbirth.
68
  Two weeks later, Doe revisited 
the doctor and again refused the procedure (along with her husband) on religious grounds.
69
  Dr. 
Meserow and the hospital filed a petition seeking an appointed custodian for the fetus.
70
  The 
trial court denied the petition.
71
  Doe vaginally delivered a healthy baby boy a few weeks later.
72
 
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the rights of a viable fetus should be 
balanced against the rights of a competent pregnant woman who refuses medical treatment as 
invasive as a c-section “even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.”73  
The appellate court found that Illinois common law protected the right of a competent individual 
to refuse medical treatment, including life saving or life sustaining procedures, even on religious 
grounds.
74
  The state right of privacy also protected the rights to reproductive autonomy and 
bodily integrity.
75
  The court could not countenance issuing an order whose “[e]nforcement could 
be accomplished only through physical force or its equivalent” and would require having the 
                                                 
65
 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
66
 Id. at 327.  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 328. 
72
 Id. at 329. 
73
 Id. at 326.  
74
 Id. at 330. 
75
 Id. at 331 (citing Family Life League v. Dep’t of Public Aid, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. 1986) and Stallman v. 
Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)).  The court also drew upon Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Cruzan where she stated that “[b]ecause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical 
freedom and self determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause.”  497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
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mother “fastened with restraints to the operating table, or perhaps rendered unconscious by 
forcibly injecting her with anesthetic, and then subject[ing her] to unwanted major surgery.”76  
The rights of the competent pregnant woman prevailed.
77
 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals similarly concluded in In re A.C. that the 
rights of a fetus did not trump those rights of an individual (i.e., a pregnant woman) who had 
already been born.
78
  In that case, “A.C.” was a 27 year old married pregnant woman in 
remission from cancer.
79
  Due to her medical history of multiple surgeries and cancer treatment, 
A.C. was referred to the high-risk pregnancy clinic at George Washington University Hospital.
80
  
The Hospital discovered an inoperable tumor in her right lung during the 25th week of 
pregnancy.
81
  A.C. initially indicated that she wanted to have the baby.
82
  When the doctors 
informed her that the illness was terminal, A.C. agreed to palliative treatment to sustain her life 
until the 28th week of pregnancy.
83
  However, the following morning A.C. was ambiguous as to 
whether she still wanted to have the baby, saying “something to the effect of ‘I don’t know, I 
think so.’”84   
The Hospital filed for a declaratory judgment to deliver the fetus by c-section before 28 
weeks.
85
  The trial court used a balancing test to weigh the state’s interest in surgical intervention 
against A.C’s perceived interest in not having the c-section performed.  The trial court found that 
(1) A.C. would die within 48 hours, (2) she was pregnant with a viable fetus who had a 50 to 60 
percent chance of survival if a c-section was performed, (3) the state had an “important and 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 335 (quoting In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244 n. 8). 
77
 Id. at 330-31. 
78
 573 A.2d at 1244.  
79
 Id. at 1238. 
80
 Id. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 1239. 
85
 Id. 
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legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,” and (4) the surgery would hasten 
the death of A.C. but its delay would increase the risk of death for the fetus.
86
  In balancing these 
interests, the trial court ordered the c-section even though it was “of the view that it does not 
clearly know what [A.C.’s] present views are with respect to the issue of whether or not the child 
should live or die.  She’s presently unconscious….”87  The decision was relayed to A.C. when 
she regained consciousness, but it was unclear whether she consented to the procedure.
88
  The 
trial court reconvened later that day and again ordered that a c-section be performed even though 
it still could not determine her intent.
89
 
The appellate court addressed two issues: (1) who had the right to decide the course of 
medical treatment for a dying patient who was pregnant with a viable fetus, and (2) how should a 
court proceed when a pregnant patient was incapable of making an informed decision as to a 
course of medical treatment for herself and her fetus.
90
  The court began its analysis by 
expressing the “tenet common to all medical treatment cases: that any person has the right to 
make an informed choice, if competent to do so, to accept or forego medical treatment.”91  This 
doctrine of informed consent was based on an individual’s right to bodily integrity whereby 
“courts do not compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her bodily 
integrity for the benefit of another person’s health.”92  While such a right was not absolute in the 
face of the four widely-recognized countervailing state interests, there had to be a compelling 
                                                 
86
 Id. at 1240. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id.  When the trial court reconvened to determine whether A.C. had consented to the c-section, Dr. Weingold 
testified that she “very clearly mouthed words several times, I don’t want it done.  I don’t want it done.”  Id. at 1241 
(emphasis in original). 
89
 Id. at 1241. 
90
 Id. at 1238.  
91
 Id. at 1243. 
92
 Id. 
15 
 
justification for overriding a competent individual’s right to refuse medical treatment.93  The 
court concluded that there was none as the rights of a fetus did not trump the rights of an 
individual who had already been born.
94
  The court rejected the idea that pregnant women should 
be held to a different standard due to their pregnancies and quickly dismissed any possible state 
interest.
95
  Furthermore, the appellate court found that the trial court should have used the 
substituted judgment standard, rather than the balancing test, in order to ascertain what A.C. 
would have done if she had been capable of making an informed decision.
96
   
The appellate court also briefly reflected on the “practical consequences” of enforcing a 
court-ordered c-section.
97
  If A.C. had refused to follow the court order then how might the court 
have forced her compliance?  Clearly imprisonment or a daily fine would not be effective.
98
  The 
only possible means to ensure compliance would be through 
physical force or its equivalent.  A.C. would have to be fastened with restrains 
to the operating table, or perhaps involuntarily rendered unconscious by 
forcibly injecting her with an anesthetic, and then subjected to unwanted 
major surgery. Such actions would surely give one pause in a civilized 
society, especially when A.C. had done no wrong.
99
 
 
Yet this is not unlike the means of enforcement that an appellate court permitted nine years later 
in Florida. 
In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., the District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida concluded that a competent pregnant woman was legally 
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required to undergo a c-section because it “was medically necessary in order to avoid a 
substantial risk that her baby would die during delivery.”100  Laura Pemberton wanted to 
vaginally deliver her second child.
101
   Ms. Pemberton could not find a physician who would 
perform such a delivery because she posed an increased risk of uterine rupture from a prior c-
section.
102
  So she chose to have a vaginal delivery at home with a midwife.
103
   
After more than a day of labor, Ms. Pemberton became dehydrated and went to the 
emergency room at Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center for fluids.
104
  Dr. Wendy 
Thompson, a board-certified family practice physician, declined to provide fluids and advised 
Ms. Pemberton that she needed a c-section.
105
  Ms. Pemberton refused to undergo the procedure 
and left the Hospital.
106
 The Hospital sought a court order to compel the c-section and requested 
a hearing.  The judge convened a hearing at the Hospital and sent a law enforcement officer to 
fetch Ms. Pemberton “by ambulance against her will.”107  After hearing testimony from several 
doctors that a vaginal birth would pose a substantial risk of uterine rupture and death of the baby, 
the judge ordered that a c-section be performed.
108
 
Ms. Pemberton sued the Hospital for violating her substantive constitutional right of 
bodily integrity, right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and right to make important 
decisions “regarding the bearing of children without undue governmental interference.”109 
The District Court recognized Ms. Pemberton’s “constitutional interests” but concluded that they 
did not outweigh the state’s interest “in preserving the life of the unborn child.”110  The court 
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relied upon Roe’s recognition that “by the point of viability – roughly the third trimester of 
pregnancy – the state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus outweighs the mother’s own 
constitutional interests in determining whether she will bear a child.”111  The court pointed to the 
fact that no doctor was willing to attempt vaginal delivery at home or at the Hospital as a safety 
consideration falling under the auspices of the state’s interests.112  Therefore, the state’s interest 
in the life of the fetus outweighed Ms. Pemberton’s interest in her right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment.
113
 
IV. The Intrusion of Abortion-Related Informed Consent Laws and Compelled Medical 
Treatment on the Doctor-Pregnant Patient Relationship 
 
In Canterbury v. Spence, the patient sought damages for personal injuries allegedly 
sustained as a result of an operation negligently performed, a negligent failure to disclose a risk 
of serious disability inherent in the operation, and negligent post-operative care.
114
  The court 
found that the patient and his mother made out a prima facie case that the physician violated his 
duty to disclose the risk of paralysis from the operation.  There the Court found that  
the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its 
materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision 
must be unmasked… to safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his own 
determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate 
disclosure.
115
 
 
Judge Robinson suggested that the standard is the uniform application of the negligence principle 
to medical practice.  However, the negligence principle normally evaluates the conduct of a 
reasonable actor and not the expectations of a reasonable victim.  Ironic that a doctrine 
developed to foster and recognize individual choice is measured by an objective standard.   
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The informed consent doctrine functions to, among other things, protect individual 
autonomy, encourage doctors to carefully consider their decisions, avoid fraud and duress, and 
foster rational decision-making by the patient.  It rests on the assumption that the health care 
provider has greater knowledge than the patient and a required information exchange best 
protects the patient.  At the same time, it includes the patient in the decision-making process.   
For example, The Joint Commission (TJC) requires hospitals to inform their patients that 
they “have the right to make decisions about [their] care, including refusing care” and have “the 
right to be listened to.”116  TJC defines informed consent as “your health care providers have 
talked to you about your treatment and its risks.  They have also talked to you about options to 
treatment and what can happen if you aren’t treated.”117  The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) outlines the standards of care for hospitals participating in Medicare and/or 
Medicaid.  Specifically, HHS requires providers to recognize the patients to “request or refuse 
treatment.”118  The American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG) have noted that the standard of informed consent applies to women 
throughout all stages of their pregnancies.  The ACOG Committee on Ethics has explained that 
“[p]regnancy does not obviate or limit the requirement to obtain informed consent. Intervention 
on behalf of the fetus must be undertaken through the body and within the context of the life of 
the pregnant woman, and therefore her consent for medical treatment is required, regardless of 
the treatment indication.”119 
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Nadia Sawicki provides a thoughtful analysis of the expansion of state abortion informed 
consent statutes.
120
  She posits informed consent as a more nuanced, flexible and value-laden 
doctrine than the overly simplistic, static and neutral doctrine put forward by critics.
121
  
Specifically, Sawicki “calls into question the feasibility of a doctrine of informed consent that 
aspires to complete neutrality” and notes that “it is questionable whether even the most stringent 
procedures for assuring such neutrality can effectively be shielded from political and personal 
agendas.”122  Yet the courts have adopted informed consent as the measuring stick by which the 
regulation of abortion is expanded and restricted.  Judicial intervention on the basis of informed 
consent renders nearly every decision a pregnant woman makes subject to scrutiny by her 
doctors and the courts. 
In Casey and Gonzales the Supreme Court established that a state may require that 
physicians provide truthful, non-misleading information “relevant” to a woman’s decision to 
have an abortion.
123
  Such informed consent disclosures are permissible even when the 
information expresses a preference for life so long as it does not impose a substantial obstacle or 
an undue burden.
124
  The Casey decision vaguely described what constitutes a “substantial 
obstacle,” stating that “[r]egulations that do no more than create a structural mechanism by 
which the State… may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted.”  It 
remains unclear how a state might express “profound respect” for life through a “structural 
mechanism” that does not pose a substantial obstacle to pregnant women.125 
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Many states have taken Casey's lead by adopting structural mechanisms in the form of 
informed consent laws that direct the conversations between doctors and their pregnant patients 
prior to or at the time when abortions are performed.
126
  Two recent federal circuit cases 
highlight how First Amendment and undue burden challenges fail unless the disclosure is 
untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant to the woman’s decision. 
In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, the Eighth 
Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction of a South Dakota statue, S.D.C.L. § 42-23A-10.01, 
requiring that (1) a woman seeking an abortion receive certain information materials, (2) she 
give written informed consent prior to the procedure, and (3) the attending physician certify that 
she understands the information.
127
  The information materials included a statement informing 
the woman 
… (b) That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being; 
 
(c) That the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human 
being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States 
Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota; 
 
(d) That by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing 
constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated; 
 
(e) A description of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically 
significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would be subjected….128 
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In addition, the statute required that a woman receive information about medical assistance 
benefits for bringing the pregnancy to term at least 24 hours prior to the abortion.
129
  A physician 
who knowingly or recklessly failed to provide this information would be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.
130
  Medical emergencies were the only exception to the statute.
131
 
 Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota, along with its medical 
director Dr. Carole E. Ball, challenged the statute for, among other things, violating physicians’ 
free speech rights “by compelling them to deliver the State’s ideological message” and unduly 
burdening patients’ right to an abortion due to an inadequate health exception.132  The Eighth 
Circuit found that the statute was not facially unconstitutional as it did not prevent a woman from 
having an abortion nor did it compel doctors to engage in ideological speech.
133
  Drawing upon 
Casey and Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “[w]hile the State cannot compel an 
individual simply to speak the State's ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to 
require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s 
decision to have an abortion….”134 
 In her dissent, Circuit Judge Diana Murphy compared the South Dakota informed consent 
provisions to other state laws consistent with Casey.
135
  Circuit Judge Murphy found that the 
South Dakota provisions required physicians to make “unique statements… unrelated to the 
intended medical procedure” on “metaphysical matters about which there is no medical 
                                                 
129
 Id. at 727. 
130
 Id. (citing S.D.C.L. § 34-23A-10.2).  S.D.C.L. § 34-23A-10.2 provides that the pregnant woman would not be 
penalized. 
131
 Id. at 726 (citing S.D.C.L. § 42-23A-10.01).  In which case, the physician would note in the patient’s file that a 
medical emergency prevented the acquisition of informed consent.  Id. 
132
 Id. at 727. 
133
 Id. at 735. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id. at 740 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 
684, 686 (7th Cir. 2002); Karlin, 188 F.3d at 481-82; Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); 
Eubank v. Schmidt, 126 F.Supp.2d 451, 455 n.5 (W.D.Ky. 2000); Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F.Supp. 
1482, 1486 (D.Utah 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995)).  
22 
 
consensus.”136  Unlike the provisions of other informed consent statutes, the South Dakota 
statements contained ideological beliefs rather than medically relevant information.
137
  
Furthermore, the requirement that the physician-patient discussion be written down and included 
in the patient’s medical record intruded upon the doctor-patient relationship.138 
Recently in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the Fifth 
Circuit upheld Texas House Bill  15, codified in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.012,  “relating 
to informed consent to an abortion.”139  H.B. 15 amends the 2003 Texas Woman’s Right to 
Know Act and requires a doctor to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, play the 
heartbeat of the fetus, explain to the pregnant woman the results of each procedure, and then wait 
24 hours between the disclosures and performing the abortion.
140
  The woman may decline to 
view the sonogram or hear the heartbeat, but she cannot decline to hear an explanation of the 
sonogram unless she qualifies for one of the three statutory exceptions.
141
  She also must 
complete a form stating that she has received these materials, understands her right to view the 
sonogram and hear the heartbeat, and chooses to have an abortion.
142
  The doctor must retain a 
copy of this form for seven years.
143
  If the woman does not have an abortion, the doctor must 
provide her with information on establishing paternity and securing child support.
144
  The 
plaintiff abortion providers challenged the statute for as violating the First Amendment and 
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compelling them to impart an “ideological message” that discourages women to have an abortion 
rather than serves a medical purpose.
145
 
The Fifth Circuit drew upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales to 
find that informed consent laws do not impose an undue burden if they require “truthful,” 
“nonmisleading,” and “relevant disclosures.”146  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that reasonable state 
regulation of medical practice is not tantamount to compelling ideological speech in violation of 
the First Amendment.
147
  Instead, the informed consent ensures that a woman understands the 
consequences of an abortion.
148
  That the woman might then decide not to have an abortion does 
not render the Act invalid.
149
  The court also found the required written consent acceptable as 
well since it is obtained for other medical procedures.
150
 
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ objections to the provision of sonograms and 
the fetal heartbeat and found that they were “medically necessary.”151  Just as the Casey decision 
was vague as to what qualifies as a “substantial obstacle” in an undue burden, the Lakey court 
was vague as to how information about the development of the fetus is medically relevant.  The 
Lakey court believed that withholding current medical information was “more of an abuse of [the 
woman’s] ability to decide than providing the information.”152  The court points to the “gravity 
of the decision” as requiring informed consent and the provision of relevant medical 
information.
153
  Yet how is it not a substantial obstacle or an undue burden when the Lakey court  
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acknowledges that “discouraging abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures”?154 
Lakey is distinguishable from Casey in that it interferes with the doctor-patient 
relationship.  In Casey, the Court acknowledged that “constitutional right of privacy between a 
pregnant woman and her physician.”155 The Casey statute contained a provision that a physician 
need not comply if he or she could reasonably believed that giving the information would 
adversely effect the physical or mental health of the patient.
156
  Thus a physician could exercise 
his medical judgment.
157
  
The provision of “truthful,” “nonmisleading,” and “relevant disclosures” comes into play 
both with Lakey and Rounds.  Courts are willing to uphold the statute provided that the medical 
information is sound and no different from what might be disclosed for other medical 
procedures.  Contrast the Lakey statute with the Iowa informed consent statute.  Pursuant to Iowa 
Code § 147.137 (1975), informed consent consists of a consent in writing which 
1. Sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the procedure or 
procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage, 
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or 
disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures, with the 
probability of each such risk if reasonably determinable. 
 
2. Acknowledges that the disclosure of that information has been made and that 
all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a 
satisfactory manner. 
 
3. Is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be performed, or if the 
patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to consent, is signed by a person who 
has legal authority to consent on behalf of that patient in those circumstances.
158
 
 
In contrast, the Lakey statute provides that informed consent to an abortion occurs only when the 
physician provides the following “medical” information to the pregnant woman, including 
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(A) the physician's name; 
(B) the particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion procedure 
to be employed, including, when medically accurate: 
(i) the risks of infection and hemorrhage; 
(ii) the potential danger to a subsequent pregnancy and of infertility; and 
(iii) the possibility of increased risk of breast cancer following an induced 
abortion and the natural protective effect of a completed pregnancy in 
avoiding breast cancer; 
(C) the probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to 
be performed; and 
(D) the medical risks associated with carrying the child to term….159 
 
One has to wonder how Justice Ginsburg would rule in the instance of Lakey as the statute 
pertains to informed consent.  As previously noted, in her Gonzales dissent Justice Ginsburg was 
concerned that the Supreme Court had prevented women from making a choice as to what 
procedure they underwent.
160
  In Lakey, the statute does not prevent women from making a 
choice as to medical treatment but instead compels doctors to inform them of the consequences 
of the abortion procedure. 
V. Conclusion 
According to the Guttmacher Institute, states enacted a record number of reproductive 
health and rights-related provisions in 2011.
161
  In March 2012, an Oklahoma state judge issued a 
permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of a similar mandatory ultrasound and detailed 
descriptions law, finding that “it improperly is addressed only to patients, physicians and 
sonographers concerning abortions and does not address all patients, physicians and 
sonographers concerning other medical care where a general law could clearly be made 
applicable.”162  That same month the Virginia legislature approved a law requiring a woman 
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seeking an abortion to undergo an ultrasound at least 24 hours prior to the procedure, be given an 
opportunity to see the image, and have the abortion provider keep a copy of the image in the 
woman’s medical record for seven years.163  The original version of the law would have required 
women to undergo transvaginal sonograms if the ultrasound failed to determine the age of the 
fetus.
164
  As of May 2012, seven states require abortion providers to perform ultrasounds and 
offer the women an opportunity to view the images.
165
   
Yet there are no laws requiring informed consent disclosures of the same invasive and/or 
graphic degree for other medical procedures.  The law is regulating pregnant women’s right to 
consent to or refuse medical treatment beyond the traditional notions of compelling state 
interests in protecting life.  In so doing, the law has intruded on the traditional doctor-pregnant 
patient relationship and transformed it into a power struggle of competing maternal-fetal-third 
party interests. 
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